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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants,

Case No. 19645

and
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION
and JEEP CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained
by plaintiffs on October 1G, 1979, when the vehicle in which
they were riding, a Jeep Commando, manufactured eight years
earlier in 1971, was struck from behind by defendant Larry
Anderson, causing plaintiffs' vehicle to roll over.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Anderson was negligent and
that he was in the course and scope of his employment with
defendant Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company at the time
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the accident.

Plaintiffs later joined defendants Jeep

Corporation and American Motors Sales Corporation, claiming
that their vehicle, manufactured by defendant Jeep
Corporation in 1971 and originally marketed by defendant
American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year,
was defectively designed and therefore unreasonably dangerous
at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer.

See

Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts; Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.,

601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following trial to a jury, the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Utah County, Utah, J. Robert
Bullock, District Judge, presiding, entered judgment on the
jury verdict for the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead and against
all defendants in the total amount of $1,638,125.00.
Liability on the judgment was apportioned pursuant to further
findings by the jury that defendants Jeep Corporation and
American Motors Sales Corporation were 70% responsible for
the injuries sustained by Mr. Whitehead and that defendants
Anderson and Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company were 30%
responsible.

The claim of plaintiff Deborah Whitehead has

been dismissed with prejudice and is not an issue in this
appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants

American Motors Sales Corporation and

Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep") seek

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reversal of the trial court's judgment against them on the
grounds that the trial court made incorrect and prejudicial
rulings on questions of law and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence.

Indeed, AMC/Jeep contends that

the trial court abandoned any pretext of impartiality during
the course of the trial and that the jury was permitted to
hear only one side of this case.

Specifically, the trial

court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's
fundamental right to cross-examine plaintiffs' witnesses; (c)
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by
excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence;
(d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based on improper closing arguments by opposing counsel; (e) in refusing
to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to
include a statute of limitations defense; (f) in refusing to
direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of their
statute of limitations defense; and (g) in excluding all
evidence relating to the presence of and plaintiffs' failure
to utilize available seat belts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
^*

Background Facts.

Sometime prior to 1966, the Kaiser-Jeep Corporation
designed and began to manufacture a vehicle called the Jeep
Commando.

In 1970, American Motors Corporation purchased all

outstanding shares of capital stock of Kaiser-Jeep

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Corporation from Kaiser Industries Corporation, and the name
Kaiser-Jeep Corporation was changed to Jeep Corporation.

(R.

219, 671). This litigation revolves around a particular Jeep
Commando manufactured by Jeep Corporation in December, 1971,
(T., 10/25/83, at 930; R. 2710), nearly eight years before
plaintiffs' accident, for sale by appellant American Motors
Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, at least seven
years before plaintiffs1 accident.
The Commando at issue in this case was purchased in
"used" condition by George Mollner of Orem, Utah in 1975 or
1976,

(T., 10/19/83, at 336; R. 2105), Mr. Mollner made

several repairs and alterations to the Commando, (id.., at
336-338, 343, 347-355; R. 2105-2107, 2112, 2116-2124), and on
October 16, 1979, permitted his daughter, plaintiff Deborah
Whitehead, to use the Commando to move some household items,
(^d.,

at 338; R. 2107).

Deborah Whitehead picked up her

husband, plaintiff Steven Whitehead, in American Fork, Utah,
and proceeded to drive him on Interstate 15 towards
Springville.

(Id., at 375-376; R. 2144-2145).

After plain-

tiffs had been on the freeway for several miles, and while
they were traveling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour,
the Commando was struck from behind by another vehicle, an
Oldsmobile, driven by defendant Larry Anderson.
377-382; R. 2146-2147).

(j[d., at

At the time it struck plaintiffs'

Commando, defendant Anderson's Oldsmobile was traveling at
the rate of 65 to 70 miles per hour; 15 miles per hour faster
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than plaintiffs.

(T., 10/20/83, at 552; R. 2327)-

The

Oldsmobile struck the Commando on its left rear corner,
causing it to spin in a clockwise manner (Id., at 556; R.
2329).

The Commando went out of control (T., 10/19/83, at

382; R. 2151), and eventually rolled over and came to rest in
the median.

(Id.., at 383; R. 2152).

During the course of

the accident, Deborah and Steven Whitehead sustained various
injuries, the most serious of which was a spinal chord injury
sustained by Steven Whitehead resulting in paraplegia.

(Id.,

at 447; R. 2216) .
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint herein on
October 11, 1979, naming only Larry Anderson, the driver of
the car that struck the Commando from behind, as a defendant.
(R. 7-8).

Plaintiffs subsequently added Anderson's employer,

Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company as a defendant, and
finally filed their Second Amended Complaint naming AMC/Jeep
on July 31, 1980.

(R. 84-87).

Jeep Corporation answered the

Second Amended Complaint on November 11, 1980.

(R. 113-114).

American Motors Sales Corporation answered the Second Amended
Complaint on September 12, 1983.
B.

(R. 993-995).

Pre-Trial Rulings.

Trial to a jury commenced on October 18, 1983.
day prior to that date, however, the trial court made the
first in a series of

crucial, erroneous and prejudicial

evidentiary rulings which were to dictate the entire
three-week trial which followed.

On October 17, 1983, the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

One

trial court considered plaintiffs' Motion In Limine "to allow
the admissibility of a certain pictorial movie developed by
Dynamic Science, Inc. for the Insurance Institute of Highway
Safety", purporting to depict automobiles rolling over during
"normal" highway maneuvers.

(R. 1128-1129).

AMC/Jeep ob-

jected to the motion (R. 1200-1224) and to the admission of
the film on the grounds that:

(1) the Dynamic Science film

showed Jeep CJ5s and CJ7s rolling over, not Commandos;

(2)

the tests reflected in the film were conducted under conditions wholly dissimilar to the off-center rear-end collision
which led to plaintiffs' accident; and (3) plaintiffs offered
no foundation to show that the maneuvers depicted in the film
were in any way relevant to the issue before the court and
jury in this case.

AMC/Jeep further objected to the film on

the ground that it had been selectively edited to dramatize
the rollovers and to enhance the visual impact, destroying
the value of the film as demonstrative evidence.

For

example, the film showed anthropomorphic dummies, fully
dressed, being tossed about violently during a rollover.
There was no evidence that plaintiffs experienced similar
movement during their accident.

Finally, AMC/Jeep argued

The evidence showed that CJ5s have a wheel base 20 inches
shorter than the wheel base of a Commando. (T., 10/24/83, at
659, 672; R. 2436, 2449.) It was also clear that a longer
wheel base makes a vehicle more resistant to rollover. (Id.,
at 674-675; R. 2451-2452).
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that if plaintiffs were allowed to show the film raising the
inference that the non-Commando vehicles depicted in it were
"comparable" to a Commando, AMC/Jeep should similarly be
allowed to introduce evidence showing that, in fact, the
Commando's handling characteristics and resistance to
rollover compared favorably to other automobiles.

(T.,

Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 53-59; R.
4856-4861).

The trial court nevertheless rejected AMC/Jeep's

arguments against the Insurance Institute film and ruled that
any difference between the tests depicted in that film and
the actual events of plaintiffs1 accident would go "to the
weight of it and not to the admissibility."

(^Id., at 60; R.

4863; see also jLd., at 62; R. 4865).
On the morning of October 18, 1983, just before the
trial began, the trial court also addressed plaintiffs'
Motion in Limine "to preclude the defendants or their
witnesses or attorneys from mentioning the subject of seat
belts or the use or nonuse of seatbelts at the trial of this
case."

(R. 1274-1294).

AMC/Jeep opposed the motion arguing

that (1) the failure of plaintiffs to utilize their seat
belts was relevant to the issues of comparative fault and
mitigation of damages, and (2) the presence of seat belts in
the Commando was relevant to the question whether the
Commando was defectively designed.

Here, as throughout the

trial, the trial court barred any comment on the presence of
or plaintiffs1 failure to utilize the Commando's seat belts.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(See also T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83,
at 88, 156; R. 4891, 4959).

(T., 10/18/83, at 12; R.

1763) .
C.

Plaintiffs1 Case in Chief.

During the presentation of plaintiffs' case-inchief, Newell Knight was called as a witness for plaintiffs
to express an opinion as to the allegedly "defective" nature
of the accident vehicle.

(T., 10/20/83, at 541; R. 2314).

AMC/Jeep, anxious to assure that all such testimony would be
related to Commandos and that the jury not be misled into
believing that "a Jeep is a Jeep," attempted to limit the
testimony to the relevant characteristics of the Commando.
Beginning with Mr. Knight, however, the trial court embarked
on an erroneous course of permitting plaintiffs' expert
witnesses to lump all Jeep vehicles into the same evidentiary
ball,

(id., at 559-560; R. 2327-2328;

see especially id.,

at 559-559; R. 2331-2332; id., at 560; R. 2333), thus
obscuring the unique characteristics of the Commando.
Plaintiffs then called LeRoy Maurice Shaw, a consultant in automotive safety.
2408).

(T., 10/24/83, at 631; R.

As plaintiffs' counsel began to delve into Mr. Shaw's

opinion about the Commando's handling characteristics,
AMC/Jeep elicited by way of voir dire that one of his basic
exhibits —

a mathematical prediction of the so-called "roll-

over threshold" of a Commando (Exhibit 56) —

was actually

based on information and data with respect to the Jeep CJ5
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and CJ7 —
2457).

not the Commando.

(Id., at 672-679; R. 2450-

The trial court, nevertheless, admitted the evidence

over the objection of AMC/Jeep, (id., at 678; R. 2456), and
then exacerbated the error by unduly restricting the right of
AMC/Jeep to test Mr. Shaw's credibility by repeatedly sustaining objections to cross-examination into Mr. Shaw's
knowledge of the design period of the accident vehicle.
(Id., at 782-783; R. 2561-2562).
Similarly, through their "star" witness, Robert
Lloyd Anderson, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce two
additional films prepared at Dynamic Science showing Jeep
CJ5s, not Commandos, rolling over when subjected to extraordinary tests never encountered under normal driving conditions and certainly not encountered by plaintiffs during the
course of their accident.

AMC/Jeep objected to the admission

of these films on the ground that they showed CJ5s, not
Commandos, rolling over as the result of mechanically-induced
maneuvers that bore no relation to the circumstances of
plaintiffs1 accident.

One of the tests, for example,

showed

a CJ5 undergoing a maneuver in which 240 degrees of steer is
mechanically input into the vehicle in the span of 1.8
seconds while the speed of the vehicle is being artificially
maintained.

(T., 10/25/83, at 910; R. 2690).

No attempt

2
Other maneuvers depicted in the films included a "test at
25 miles an hour and 180 degrees on the steering wheel. Then
we go up to 270 degrees. And the next turn is 360 degrees."
(T., 10/25/83, at 915-916; R. 2695-2700).
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was made to show any connection between the maneuvers
depicted in the film to the actual events of plaintiffs'
accident.

In fact, Mr. Anderson admitted that he had "no way

of knowing" what type of steering maneuvers were undertaken
by Mrs. Whitehead during the course of the accident.
at 957; R. 2737).

(Id.,

The trial court nevertheless overruled

AMC/Jeep's objection to the films, stating that "I'll let you
get at it any way you v/ant to by cross examination or
whatever.

But I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your

objection with respect to those films."

(I^d. , at 109; R.

4912) .
The objectionable films were then shown to the jury
as exemplary of the handling characteristics of "CJ
vehicles."

(T., 10/25/83, at 906; R. 2676).

The plain and

intended implication was that the vehicles shown in those
films were similar to the Commando and that they demonstrated
the circumstances experienced by plaintiffs and the accident
vehicle at the time of the accident even though Mr. Anderson
admitted that he, in fact, had no way of knowing what
steering movements were made by plaintiffs immediately prior
to and during plaintiffs' accident.

(I^d., at 956-957; R.

2736-2737).
The ultimate point made by Mr. Anderson was that
the handling characteristics of "Jeeps", coupled with their
"rollover propensities", rendered the Commando involved in
this case unreasonably dangerous.

(Ij3.# at 897; R. 2677).
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Mr. Anderson also testified that other vehicles he had
tested, the SIO Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, did not have
delays in handling response similar to those of a "Jeep",
{16..,

at 896; R. 2676), and that "most vehicles" would main-

tain control in situations similar to those experienced by
plaintiffs at the time of the accident.

(Id., at 1039-1040;

R. 2818-2819).
In its cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, AMC/Jeep
attempted to rebut Mr. Anderson's characterization and implication that "Jeeps" are more dangerous than other
automobiles on the road by asking him: (1) whether other
vehicles would have gone out of control if subjected to
circumstances like those which caused plaintiffs' accident
(id., at 963; R. 2743); (2) whether he thought that other
vehicles with similar track widths were also defective (id.,
at 1001; R. 2780); (3) whether he thought other vehicles were
defective (jld. ) ; (4) whether other vehicles have the same
center of gravity as a Commando, (id.., at 1003; R. 2782); (5)
whether all convertibles are defective if they do not have
rollbars (^Ld., at 1004; R. 2783); (6) whether he knows what
other vehicles will do when subjected to the tests shown in
the films (id., at 1005, 1018; R. 2784, 2797); and (7)
whether CJ5s have different suspensions than a Commando.
(1^., at 1047; R. 2826).

In spite of previous assurances by

the trial court that AMC/Jeep would be permitted to crossexamine Mr. Anderson on these issues, (T., 10/25/83,
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Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, at 109; R. 4912),
however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs1 objections to
these questions and precluded AMC/Jeep from pursuing its
cross-examination of plaintiffs' key expert witness.
The trial court's decision to admit films of CJ5s
to demonstrate the characteristics of a Commando combined
with the trial court's rigid restriction of AMC/Jeep's
cross-examination of Mr. Anderson led to AMC/Jeep's first
Motion for Mistrial on October 26, 1983.

(T., Abstracts from

Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 123; R. 4926).

The grounds

for the Motion were that plaintiffs' experts had been allowed, without foundation, to declare the Commando unreasonably dangerous based (1) upon comparisons to other
vehicles undergoing maneuvers in no way related to the subject accident, (2) upon certain calculations derived from
tests of the CJ5, and (3) upon opinion testimony that "Jeeps"
roll over more easily than "other vehicles," while AMC/Jeep
had been barred from showing that the relevant
characteristics of Jeeps, in fact, compared favorably with
other vehicles.

(jEd. , at 117-123; R. 4920-4926).

The trial

court, nevertheless, denied the Motion for Mistrial stating
that "under the circumstances as they exist at this time in
this lawsuit, the evidence of what other vehicles do is
irrelevant."

(_Id., at 130; R. 4933).

The trial court later

attempted to justify its erroneous ruling as prohibiting
AMC/Jeep "from attempting to show that the subject Jeep in
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this case was safe by evidence which shows that other
vehicles not manufactured by Jeep are also unsafe."
10/26/83, at 1171; R. 2949).

(T.,

The trial court had, of course,

permitted plaintiffs' experts to compare "Jeeps" with
vehicles manufactured by others.

It was only when AMC/Jeep

sought to inquire further into that very comparative
testimony that the trial court concluded it was irrelevant.
In so ruling, the trial court did not even suggest to the
jury that the comparisons adduced by plaintiffs should not be
considered.

(Id../ at 60; R. 4863; see also JLd. at 62; R.

4865) .
Plaintiffs' next expert witness was John N. Noettl.
Mr. Noettl, like Mr. Anderson, brought along a film showing
CJ5s rolling over.

Mr. Noettl's film, however, also showed

fully clothed anthropomorphic "dummies" being tossed about
during the testing.

AMC/Jeep objected to this film on the

basis of its lack of relevance and its inflammatory nature,
(T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 131133; R. 4934-4936), but after being shown in chambers on
October 26, 1983, (T., 10/26/83, at 1205; R. 2982), the trial
court ruled that it could be admitted.

As with all of plain-

tiffs1 films, there was absolutely no foundation for the
implicit proposition that the maneuvers exhibited in the film
were related to the maneuvers experienced by the accident
vehicle during the accident.

Mr. Noettl was then permitted

to testify that the "Jeep" is easier to overturn than a
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"passenger car."

(Jxl., at 1262; R. 3039).

As was the case

with Mr. Anderson, however, AMC/Jeep's efforts to cross examine on this point were blocked by the trial court.

(Id..,

at 1266; R. 3043) .
D*

AMC/Jeep's Case.

AMC/Jeep began its case on October 27, 1983.
Before AMC/Jeep called its chief expert, however, the trial
court heard plaintiffs' objections to two films to be introduced through that expert.

One film was of a CJ5 and was

intended to rebut plaintiffs' evidence purporting to prove
that CJ5s roll over under certain emergency situations.

The

film demonstrated the CJ5's stability when subjected to
extreme emergency situations.
1566; R. 3343, 3347-3348).

(T., 10/27/83, at 1561, 1565-

The second film was similarly

intended to rebut plaintiffs' theory that Jeeps roll more
often than other cars, or that Jeeps are the only vehicles
that would have rolled under the circumstances of the plaintiffs' accident.

Unlike plaintiffs, however, AMC/Jeep was

precluded from presenting its evidence, the court ruling that
neither film was admissible.

(1^*/

at

1571, 1576; R. 3353,

3358).
AMC/Jeep then proceeded to call Edward Heitzman, a
mechanical engineer with extensive experience in the field of
automobile safety.

(^d.,

at 1577-1587; R. 3359-3369).

Through Mr. Heitzman, AMC/Jeep attempted to introduce a film
showing non-Jeep vehicles undergoing certain maneuvers with
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"outriggers" attached',

for the purpose of rebutting plain-

tiffs1 film which had shown a Commando equipped with
"outriggers".

Plaintiffs1 expert, Mr. Anderson, had tes-

tified that but for the outriggers the Commando in his film
would have rolled over.
2706).

(T., 10/25/83, at 918-926; R. 2698-

Mr. Heitzman testified, however, that, in his

opinion, Mr. Anderson's film did not illustrate situations in
which the Commando would have rolled.
1674-1676; R. 3457-3459).

(T., 10/28/83, at

Mr. Heitzman would then have

utilized his film to illustrate to the jury the difference
between a vehicle with outriggers "rolling" and a similarly
equipped car not rolling.

The film would also have rebutted

plaintiffs' testimony that only Jeeps, as opposed to more
common vehicles, would roll over in emergency situations.
AMC\Jeep needed these films in order to illustrate Mr.
Heitzman's point that many types of vehicles —
Jeeps and certainly not just Commandos —

not just

subjected to the

conditions illustrated in plaintiffs' films will roll over.
The films would have shown that, in fact, other vehicles
subjected to the same type of tests would have rolled over.
(T., 10/28/83, at 1746-1750; R. 3529-3533).

The court,

however, refused to permit the introduction of appellants'

Outriggers are attached to a test vehicle in order to
restrain it from rolling over completely. An expert's eye
and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers
would have rolled over but for the outriggers. (T.,
10/28/83, at 1744; R. 3527).
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film "because it's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because
they involve other vehicles which the jury would have to take
into consideration as to how it was done, the comparisons,
the whole works

"

(.Id., at 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-

3530, 3533) .
AMC/Jeep then called Dr. Charles Warner, a
mechanical engineer and automobile accident consultant, to
reconstruct the accident and to give his opinion that the
characteristics of the Commando had nothing to do with the
extent of plaintiffs' injuries, that virtually any automobile
would have rolled under the circumstances presented in this
case, and that the injuries suffered by plaintiffs were not
caused by the fact that the accident vehicle happened to be a
Commando.

A crucial aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his

study and reconstruction of the probable movements of
plaintiffs inside the vehicle during the course of the
accident.

(T., 10/31/83, at 1956-1961; R. 3743-3748).

In

support of this testimony Dr. Warner had prepared a series of
photographs demonstrating his opinion.
3748).

(JLSl*' a t 1961; R.

The trial court, however, sustained plaintiffs'

objection to this demonstrative exhibit on the ground "that
the probative value is limited at least because of the
photographs not being representative of just what did happen
to the vehicles."

(^d.,

at 1967; R. 3754).

AMC/Jeep had, of

course, based many of its objections to plaintiffs' evidence
on precisely this ground.

The only difference was that the
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trial court overruled AMC/Jeep's objections but sustained
those made by plaintiffs.
Dr. Warner was next to testify with respect to
certain tests he performed on an exemplar vehicle — a
Commando.

The film showed a Commando undergoing certain

emergency maneuvers with outriggers attached and would have
demonstrated that the Commando is a stable vehicle.

The film

would also have demonstrated Dr. Warner's opinion that the
Commando will remain upright when subjected to realistic
emergency situations.

AMC/Jeep also intended to introduce a

film, through Dr. Warner, demonstrating rollover and the type
of damage that typically occurs during rollover.
1976; 3764).

(_Id., at

The two films were shown in chambers (^Ld., at

1979-1983; R. 3767-3771), plaintiffs objected to both, and
the trial court ruled that both were inadmissible on the
grounds that they were "not probative of any issues except
perhaps the test which was made . . . . "
3774).

(Ijd. at 1986; R.

Again, no explanation was offered by the court as to

why plaintiffs' film —

which showed a Commando performing

certain extreme maneuvers that one could reasonably expect to
encounter, but of course showed roll overs whereas the Warner
film showed none —

presented probative evidence while the

Warner film did not.
Dr. Warner was also asked to testify as to his
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs inside the
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Commando during the course of the accident to rebut plaintiffs1 contention that the Commando's roof was defective and
that it had crushed during the course of the accident causing
plaintiff Steven Whitehead1s back injury.
10/24/83, at 663-664; R. 2441-2442).

(See, e.g., T.,

The trial court,

however, excluded each and every exhibit offered to
demonstrate this testimony.

(T., 10/31/83, at 2009-2011; R.

3797-3799).
AMC/Jeep then made a proffer, in chambers, of Dr.
Warner's testimony with respect to plaintiffs' failure to use
seat belts.

Dr. Warner would have testified that had plain-

tiff Steven Whitehead "been using the seat belt in all probability he would not have received the spinal injury that he
did receive."

(Ixl.# at 2018; R. 3806).

The trial court

again ruled, however, that no evidence of seat belts would be
admitted.

As the trial court put it:

"to speculate what the

seat belt might have done in this type of situation is just
something that the jury ought not do, and they will not have,
under my ruling, the obligation to consider. ... Therefore,
there will be no more evidence in this case with regard to
seat belts.
from there."

I want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll go
U d . , at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808).

Dr. Warner was next asked to express his opinion
with respect to the "buckling" experienced by the Commando
during the course of the accident.

Dr. Warner had examined

the actual accident vehicle and had prepared an exhibit that
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demonstrated his opinion that the Commando had been in a
prior accident.

It was Dr. Warner's opinion that the prior

accident had caused damage to the Commando which resulted in
a weakening of its structural integrity.

This weakening, he

concluded, in turn contributed to the damage suffered in the
accident.

(Id.., at 2024; R. 3812).

The trial court

sustained plaintiffs1 objection to this demonstrative exhibit
as well, (id., at 2026; R. 3814), even though Dr. Warner had
actually testified without objection to all of the information in the exhibit.
E.

Closing Argument.

Finally, after a three-week trial during which the
record reflects plaintiffs were unrestrained in their presentation of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, AMC/Jeep was
severely restricted by the court's rulings limiting their
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses, virtually all of
AMC/Jeep's' demonstrative evidence had been excluded and
their witnesses hamstrung by the court's rulings limiting
their testimony, the ultimate effects of the trial court's
rulings were noted in closing argument:
(1)

Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to argue (a)

that AMC/Jeep had offered "No positive proof.

None at all.";

(T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4582); (b) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring
no evidence, none at all," (jLd., at 33; R. 4583); and (c)
that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce of engineering data" (id., at 35; R. 4585); and
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(2)

Counsel for defendant Variable Annuity Life

made the following flatly incorrect statement to the jury:
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing
exactly what they had done, even to the
height of the outriggers off the ground;
why didn't they go out and get a
Commando, put some outriggers on there
and go do some testing of their own? Why
didn't they come in here and tell you,
'We have done the same kind of tests that
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same
number of degrees of steer in on a
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn
over'; why didn't they do that? I'll
tell you why: They v/ere afraid to do it.
They didn't dare do it. Because they
knew that Commando would turn over.
(Id., at 109; R. 4659).
AMC/Jeep had, of course, done precisely what counsel asserted had not been done.

AMC/Jeep had obtained an

exemplar vehicle, a Commando, had tested it in the very
respects stated in the above quotation, and proffered
evidence of the results of those tests, both in the form of
testimony and in the form of demonstrative motion pictures,
but the tests were systematically and erroneously excluded by
the trial court.

AMC/Jeep's motion for a mistrial based upon

the subsequent false, misleading and prejudicial arguments of
opposing counsel was nevertheless denied.

(jEd./ at 193, 197;

R. 4743, 4747).
Following these arguments the jury returned a
Special Verdict finding:

(1) that the Commando was defective

to the extent that it was unreasonably dangerous to the
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purchaser or user; (2) that the defective condition of the
Commando was a proximate cause of plaintiff Steven
Whitehead's injuries; (3) that AMC/Jeep was 70% at fault for
the injuries sustained by plaintiff Steven Whitehead; and (4)
that general and special damages totalled $1,638,125.00.
1359-1361).

(R.

The trial court then entered judgment in accord-

ance with the Special Verdict, (R. 1362-1364), and denied
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
or in the Alternative for a New Trial (R. 1569-1574, 16421644).

This appeal followed.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated

upon the theory of strict products liability set out in
Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, as adopted by
this Court in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.
2d 152 (Utah 1979).

The elements which a plaintiff must

prove under Section 402A are:
(1) That defendant sold the product at issue in the
case —

Section 402A(l);
(2) That such product was in a defective condition;

that is, a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer —

Section 402A(1), and Comment (g);
(3) That such product was unreasonably dangerous;

that is, dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
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the ordinary knowledge common in the community as to its
characteristics; Section 402A(1), and Comment (i);
(4) That the product was defective and unreasonably
dangerous at the time it left the seller's hands —

Section

402A, Comment (g);
(5) That the plaintiff is the ultimate consumer or
user of the allegedly defective product; Section 402A(l);
(6) That the product's defective and unreasonably
dangerous condition caused the plaintiff physical harm

—

Section 402A(l);
(7) That the defendant is engaged in the business
of selling the allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous
product —

Section 402A(l)(a); and
(8) That the allegedly defective and unreasonably

dangerous product is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold —

Section 402A(l)(b).

Instead or requiring plaintiffs to prove the
elements listed above, however, the trial court permitted
plaintiffs, over AMC/Jeep's objections, to proceed against
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and prejudicial evidence and expert
testimony wholly unrelated to the sole issue raised by
/

plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep:

Whether plaintiffs'

Commando was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time
it left the hands of AMC/Jeep because it rolled over while
traveling on an interstate highway at 55 miles per hour when
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struck off-center from behind by a station wagon traveling 70
miles per hour.

In fact, the only things proved by

plaintiffs at trial were:
(1)

That "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles including

Commandos, will roll over under certain mechanically
controlled conditions not normally encountered even under
emergency conditions; and
(2)

That when "Jeeps" do roll over, an unre-

strained passenger in such a vehicle will be injured.
These facts are as irrelevant to this lawsuit as
they are undisputed.
(1)

What plaintiffs failed to show was:

That Jeeps in general, and the Commando in

particular, are any different in their resistance to roll
over than the vast majority of vehicles on the road;
(2)

That the "ordinary consumer" had any reason to

expect that the Commando or any other vehicle would not roll
over under the particular circumstances of the accident made
the basis of this lawsuit; and
(3)

That plaintiffs had any reason to expect that

they could escape serious injury in the event of a roll over
absent the use of available seat belts to protect them.
As AMC/jeep's evidence would have demonstrated (had
it not been excluded by the trial court) and as AMC/Jeep's
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses would have
revealed (had that cross-examination been permitted):
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(1)

Most vehicles subjected to the tests reflected

in plaintiffs1 films would have rolled over under those
conditions;
(2)

Virtually any vehicle subjected to the

collision made the subject of this lawsuit would have rolled
over under those circumstances 7 and
(3)

That an unrestrained passenger in any vehicle

which rolls over will suffer serious injuries, whether or not
the roof collapses, because the occupants of a vehicle in
motion tend to remain in motion after a collision until they
are stopped by something —

whether the roof, the road or the

windshield.
In order to prove that a product is "in a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer" and "unreasonably
dangerous", the plaintiff in a design defect case will
normally present evidence comparing the allegedly defective
product to other products placed on the market at
approximately the same time to show that the allegedly
defective product does not meet the standards reflected in
the industry in general.

Such comparisons are generally

referred to as "state-of-the-art" or "industry standards"
evidence.

See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442,

447 (10th Cir. 1973).

Plaintiffs in this case, however,

offered no such evidence.

Instead, they offered and were

permitted to display to the jury one film after another
showing "Jeeps", and only "Jeeps", rolling over and over and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

over in response to mechanically-induced test programs.
Plaintiffs' experts were then permitted to testify, without
any foundation whatsoever, that "other vehicles" would not
have rolled over under the circumstances presented, and
AMC/Jeep was precluded from either cross-examining
plaintiffs1 witness on that subject or from presenting their
own "industry standards" evidence to rebut it.

As a result,

the case was submitted to the jury, and the jury was
permitted and, indeed, required to decide it based upon
evidence in a vacuum.
The trial court's errors which require reversal of
the judgment on the verdict can be broken down into the
following categories: (i) the trial court permitted
plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence;
(ii) the trial court limited improperly AMC/Jeep's cross
examination of plaintiffs' experts; (iii) the trial court
excluded substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's evidence; (iv)
the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based
on improper closing arguments made by opposing counsel; (v)
the trial court excluded all evidence relating to the
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seatbelts; and
(vi) the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for directed
verdict based on its statute of limitations defense.
point will be addressed in turn.
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Each

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE IRRELEVANT AND
INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE.
The issue in this case is not whether, in the
abstract, Jeeps in general or even Commandos in particular
roll over too easily.

This is not an administrative proceed-

ing to determine whether AMC/Jeep should be required to
recall and modify its utility vehicles based upon such an
alleged defect even if it were found to exist.

The sole

issues in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep were (a) whether
the plaintiffs' 1972 Commando was defectively designed and
unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands of the
manufacturer because it rolled over when struck from behind,
on an interstate highway,

by a vehicle traveling

approximately 70 miles per hour, and (b) whether the alleged
design defect was one proximate cause of plaintiffs1
injuries.
Products liability under Section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of Torts, does not remove the requirement of
causation from a lawsuit.

See Section 402A(1), Restatement

(Second) of Torts; Mulherin v. Ingersoil-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d
1301, 1303 (Utah 1981).

Even plaintiffs1 own expert noted

that while the Jeep may have a defect, the defect "may not
have anything to do with this particular accident."
10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714).

(T.,

Plaintiffs in this case were,

nevertheless, allowed to "prove" their case against AMC/Jeep
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by introducing evidence that was wholly irrelevant to the
issues presented.
Plaintiffs1 evidence primarily showed Jeep CJ5s,
not Commandos# overturning under conditions wholly dissimilar
to the conditions of plaintiffs' accident.

The conditions

and maneuvers depicted in the films were never shown to bear
any relation to the conditions and maneuvers experienced by
plaintiffs and their Commando during the accident and this
evidence was almost certainly misunderstood by the jury and
given extraordinary weight since it was the only evidence
they were permitted to hear.

Under the circumstances of this

case, the admission of such evidence is reversible error.
Plaintiffs1 absolute reliance on irrelevant
demonstrative evidence is clear.

Even before trial began,

plaintiffs moved the trial court to allow them to exhibit "a
certain pictorial movie developed by Dynamic Science, Inc.
for the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety."

(R. 1128).

AMC/Jeep opposed plaintiffs' motion, noting: (1) that the
testing represented in the film bore no relation to the
circumstances of plaintiffs' accident; (2) that the Dynamic
Science testing had involved 400 test runs while the film
showed only six of them; (3) that the film's use of slow
motion effects was misleading; (4) that the film showed only
CJ5s and not Commandos; (5) that the CJ5s in the film were
"manned" with anthropomorphic dummies which portrayed
unrealistically and violently the movement of humans during a
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rollover; and (6) that on the whole the film's prejudicial
impact outweighed its value as demonstrative evidence.
1207-1220).

(R.

The trial court brushed aside appellants1

objections, however, taking the view that any problems with
the film went to its "weight" rather than its admissibility.
(T., Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 60,
62; R. 4863, 4865).
The Insurance Institute Film was shown to the jury
in conjunction with the testimony of Mr. Noettl.

Although

Mr. Noettl had never tested a Commando and had experience
primarily with other "Jeep vehicles" he was, nevertheless,
permitted to express the opinion that the "Jeep" is easier to
overturn than a "passenger car."

(Id., at 1262; R. 3039).

(T., 10/26/83, at 1182-1183, R. 2960-2961).

In fact, Mr.

Noettl's opinion with respect to the Commando was based
almost entirely on his experience with the CJ5 and other nonCommando vehicles.

(_Id., at 1189; R. 2966).

AMC/Jeep

interposed a continuing objection to this testimony based on
the fact that a CJ5 was a different vehicle than a Commando
and that Mr. Noettl was incompetent to express an opinion as
to the Commando.

(_Id., at 1191; R. 2963).

Indeed,

plaintiffs1 own witness had admitted earlier in the trial,
for instance, that the CJ5' s v/heel base was 20 inches shorter
than the Commando's wheel base and that a longer wheel base
makes it

more difficult to roll a vehicle.

at 672-675; R. 2450-2453).

(T., 10/24/83,

Moreover, a longer wheel base
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means that more and faster steer must be "dialed into11 a
vehicle in order for it to negotiate the same turn as a
vehicle with a shorter wheel base.

The objections were,

nevertheless, overruled and Mr. Noettl continued to testify,
without foundation, that the CJ5 and the Commando were
identical for purposes of discussing their handling
characteristics.
In addition, at the time the trial court viewed Mr.
Noettl 1 s Insurance Institute film in chambers before it was
shown to the jury (ixl., at 1206; R. 2983), plaintiffs'
counsel stipulated that the film did not simulate the
conditions prevailing at the time of the accident.

(ijl*/ at

1207; R. 2984).
Mr. Noettl subsequently described the maneuvers
shown on the film as "J-Turns" and "obstacle avoidance
maneuvers," (_id.., at 1195; R. 2972), neither of which were
shown, even remotely, to simulate the conditions of
plaintiffs1 accident.

In fact, the tests themselves were run

with mechanical input into the CJ5 —
driver at all.

there was no human

Mr. Noettl also described the ignition

interrupt system that was installed in the test CJ5 in order
"to maintain the vehicle at constant speed" throughout a
particular test run.

(Ld., at 1231; R. 3008).

Of course,

there was no evidence that plaintiff Deborah Whitehead, the
driver of the Commando in this case, kept her foot on the
accelerator throughout the course of the accident.
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In fact

there was testimony that a vehicle making a turn like those
depicted in the film would normally slow down.
at 1693-1694; R. 3476-3477).

(T. 10/28/83,

The steering commands that were

mechanically induced for the tests were on the order of 588
degrees of steering input at a rate of 1562 degrees per
second.

(jEd., at 1233-1234; R. 3010-3011).

There was

testimony that, due to the Commando's longer wheel base, 736
degrees (or two complete revolutions of the steering wheel)
would have to be dialed into a Commando in order to induce
the same type of maneuver, (T., 10/27/83, at 1657-1659; R.
3439-3441), and that steering input rates of 1300 to 1600
degrees per second are "beyond human capabilities."

(T.,

10/28/83, at 1689; R. 3472). There was no evidence that
Deborah Whitehead negotiated anything resembling two complete
revolutions of the Commando's steering wheel during the
course of the accident, or even that the Commando's steering
wheel was mechanically capable of two complete revolutions.
Indeed, plaintiffs' experts had previously admitted that they
had "no way of knowing" what steering movements were made by
Deborah Whitehead during the course of the accident.

(T.,

10/25/83, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737).
There was also testimony that the CJ5 shown in the
film had been modified substantially in an attempt to
compensate for the removal of instrumentation and the
placement of test equipment in the vehicle, (T., 10/26/83, at
1257-1258; R. 3034-3035), that the tires on the test CJ5 were
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"specially prepared" to accentuate rollover, and that the
tests were "completely unrealistic."

(T., 10/28/83, at 1694-

1698; R. 3477-3481; T., 11/1/83, at 2216-2217; R. 4008-4009).
It was also clear that the film had been edited and
manipulated to highlight the instances in which a CJ5
actually rolled over.

Mr. Noettl would later admit, for

example, that 400 "runs" of the CJ5 were made by Dynamic
Science but that only six would be shown in the film (ixi., at
1214; R. 2991), and that the tests were run with mechanical
input into the Jeep (i.e., there was no human driver).
Another witness familiar with the Insurance Institute test
depicted in the film testified that five hundred runs of the
CJ5 were made by Dynamic Science and that there were only
eight roll overs in those five hundred runs.
at 1682; R. 3465).

(T., 10/28/83,

AMC/Jeepfs objections to the film were

nevertheless overruled and the film was shown to the jury.
(Id.).
Two other films of CJ5s rolling over were presented
to the jury in connection with the testimony of Mr. Anderson.
AMC/Jeep's strenuous objection to these films was identical
to its objection to Mr. Noettl's film.
106-107; R. 4909-4910).

(T., 10/25/83, at

The trial court overruled these

objections, however, stating only that: "I'll let you get at
it any way you want to by cross examination or whatever.
I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your objection with
respect to those films."

(Id., at 109; R. 4912).
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But

In addition to the films of CJ5s rolling over, the
trial court permitted plaintiffs' automotive safety
consultant, Mr. Shaw, to introduce and testify regarding a
chart purporting to show the so-called "roll over threshold"
of a Commando.

AMC/jeep objected to the chart for the reason

that it was based entirely on information Mr. Shaw had
obtained in testing CJ5s.
2449-2457).

(T., 10/24/83, at 671-679; R.

The trial court overruled the objection and Mr.

Shaw was permitted to utilize the exhibit to bolster his
opinion as to the "roll over threshold" of the Commando.
(.Id., at 687-694; R. 2466-2472).
As even this brief overview of plaintiffs'
demonstrative and expert testimony reveals, the sum and
substance of plaintiffs' case against AMC/jeep was dependent
upon the following syllogism:

(1) Jeeps are unreasonably

dangerous because they roll over too easily; (2) the Coramando
is a Jeep; (3) therefore, the Commando is unreasonably
dangerous.

The trial court committed reversible error in

permitting plaintiffs to present this theory to the jury
because, as the record reflects:

(a) the Commando is

materially different from other Jeeps, particularly the CJ5,
and (b) even assuming material similarity between the
Commando and other Jeeps, the maneuvers depicted in
plaintiffs' films bore no relation to the circumstances of
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plaintiffs1 accident,

and were so extraordinary in character

that most vehicles would have rolled over under the
conditions presented.

The only thing demonstrated by

plaintiffs1 films was that some of the CJ5s tested rolled
over under the conditions depicted in the films —

a fact

that was not an issue in this lawsuit.
The utilization of experimental evidence in a trial
of this nature is fraught with danger.

As one court recently

put it: "The problem presented by the use of experiments is
the danger of misleading the members of the jury who may
attach exaggerated significance to the test.

See generally.

The fact that plaintiffs' films bear no relation to the
circumstances of plaintiffs1 accident is shown most clearly
in the following colloquy between plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson,
who exhibited most of the films, and counsel for AMC/Jeep:
Q. Is there any way you can help us
as to what steering movements Mrs.
Whitehead may have put into that vehicle
at any point that we're talking about?
A. No. ...
Q. And is there anything that would
say Mrs. Whitehead didn't put turning
movement of more than 180 degrees into
her steering, more or less?
A. ... I couldn't say.
Q. So whether the vehicle took an
erratic path and was skidding, or what in
the world it was doing through there, you
can't help us, as far as your opinion?
A. N o . . . .
(T., 10/25/83, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737). In short,
plaintiffs1 films were exhibited purely for the purpose of
showing that "Jeeps" rolled over under the conditions
depicted in the films — a fact that was not in issue in this
lawsuit.
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McCormick on Evidence, Section 202 (2d Ed. 1972)."

Barnes

V. General Motors Corp., 547 F. 2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977).
Because of this special danger, courts have developed a
strict rule under which the use of experiments, like those
offered by plaintiffs in this case, is limited to those
situations where there is "a foundational showing ... that
the tests were conducted under conditions substantially
similar to actual conditions."

Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,

558 F. 2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1977).

Courts consistently

place "the burden ... upon the party offering evidence of
out-of-court experiments ... to lay a proper foundation
demonstrating a similarity of circumstances and conditions."
Barnes, 547 F. 2d, at 27 7.

See also Renfro Hosiery Mills Co.

v. National Cash Register Co., 552 F. 2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir.
1977) (applying North Carolina law); Weaver v. Ford Motor
Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1974) affd. 515 F. 2d
506 (3rd Cir. 1975); Jones v. Stemco Manufacturing Co., Inc.,
624 P. 2d 1044, 1047 (Okla. 1981); Sanchez v. Haddix, 95
Wash. 2d 593, 627 P. 2d 1312, 1314 (1981); Goodman v. Carson,
84 Ariz. 177, 325 P. 2d 819, 821 (1958).
Haynes v. American Motors Corporation, 691 F. 2d
1268 (8th Cir. 1982)(applying Arkansas law), illustrates the
trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs1 evidence of
experiments performed on non-Commando vehicles in situations
admittedly different from those which led to plaintiffs'
accident.

The plaintiff in Haynes sued the defendant for
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injuries suffered when her Jeep CJ5 overturned on a rainslick highway.

The jury returned a judgment in favor of the

defendant and the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow her to introduce
several television commercials depicting several models of
"Jeeps" in off-road situations.

It was the plaintiff's

contention that these commercials constituted actionable
misrepresentation because they led her to believe that her
CJ5 would not roll over when subjected to the conditions of
the accident.

The Court of Appeals held that the films were

properly excluded by the trial court/ stating:
A number of the commercials dealt with
the Jeep Cherokee, and thus had no
relevance in this case, which involves a
Jeep CJ-5. Those commercials dealing
with the CJ-5 also had little relevance
since they depicted the CJ-5 in off-theroad settings, climbing steep hills and
traversing rough terrain. In contrast,
[the plaintiff's] accident occurred when
her CJ-5 skidded off rain slick pavement
and into a ditch. ... The trial court
properly excluded these commercials,
which would have served merely to confuse
the issues before the jury and the court
properly refused to allow plaintiffs'
expert to comment on the commercials.
691 F. 2d, at 1271.
Plaintiffs' films in this case suffered from
precisely the same defects as plaintiffs' films in Haynes
interestingly enough, plaintiffs' expert in Haynes was the
same Robert Anderson who testified for plaintiffs in this
case.

Here, as in Haynes, the trial court should have
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—

excluded plaintiffs' irrelevant films because they "served
merely to confuse the issues before the jury." See also
Barnes v. General Motors Corp., 547 F. 2d, at 277.
These cases highlight the trial court's error in
this case in permitting plaintiffs to make their case against
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence and
testimony.

As in the cases discussed above, plaintiffs'

evidence merely demonstrated the correctness of a fact not in
dispute, i.e., that "Jeeps," in general, roll over in certain
situations having no bearing on the particular circumstances
of plaintiffs' accident.

The films and opinions offered by

plaintiffs' experts related to different vehicles subjected
to artificial testing and should have been excluded because
they bore no "substantial relation" to the actual vehicle and
conditions involved in plaintiffs' accident, and were likely
to be misunderstood by the jury and given exaggerated weight
when the evidence was, in fact, of no probative value
whatsoever.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BLOCKING
AMC/JEEP 1 S EFFORT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS.
The trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs'
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence alone would support this
Court's reversal of the judgment in this case.

This error

was compounded, however, by the trial court's consistent
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refusal to allow AMC/jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs1 experts in any meaningful way.
The explicit point repeatedly made by plaintiffs1
experts was that "Jeeps, " as a class of vehicles, overturned
much more readily than other vehicles, and that non-Jeep
vehicles would not have overturned under the circumstances of
plaintiffs1 accident.

(T., 10/20/83, at 558-560? 10/24/83,

at 672-679, 688; 10/25/83, at 106-108, 894, 896, 897, 10391040; R. 2331-2333, 2450-2457, 2466, 4909-4911, 2674, 2676,
2818-2819).

"Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, were

consistently and explicitly represented as being unreasonably
dangerous because of their alleged tendency to overturn "as
distinguished from some other car."
2331-2332).

(_Id., at 558-559; R.

Specifically, plaintiffs' automotive safety

expert, Mr. Shaw, was allowed to testify, without foundation,
that "there's no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone
to roll over than some others."
2495).

(T., 10/24/83, at 717; R.

Similarly, plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson testified without

foundation that "Jeeps" handled more poorly as compared to
other vehicles, (T., 10/25/83,

at 896; R. 2676), and

plaintiffs' Mr. Noettl testified that "it was very difficult
to turn a passenger car over."
3039).

(T., 10/26/83, at 1262; R.

There can be no doubt that plaintiffs' case depended

on convincing the jury that the Commando, as a "Jeep," overturned in circumstances in which "some other car" would not
have overturned.

The trial court erred, however, in blocking
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AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs'
experts regarding the foundation for those opinions and to
explore the relationship of that evidence to the circumstances of plaintiffs1 accident.
Examples of the trial court's improper restriction
of AMC/Jeep's right to cross examine plaintiffs' witnesses
occur throughout the trial transcript.

On cross-examination/

AMC/Jeep inquired of plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson whether he had
"had occasion to investigate any accident where something
besides a Jeep rolled over and hurt somebody."
1001; R. 2780).

(rd., at

After the witness responded that he had,

however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objection when
AMC/Jeep attempted to inquire into such occasions.

(Id.).

The trial court also sustained plaintiffs' objections to
questions regarding what other vehicles would do if subjected
to the circumstances depicted in the films introduced through
Mr. Anderson, (jLd.f at 1001-1005; R. 2780-2784), and whether
other vehicles can be rolled on a level surface with driver
input.

(jtd../ at 1018; R. 2797).

In each instance, the trial

court ruled that the question was irrelevant; consequently,
plaintiffs' theory that "Jeeps" are unreasonably dangerous
when compared to "other vehicles" was allowed to go
unchallenged because AMC/Jeep was not permitted to inquire
how "other vehicles" would perform under the circumstances of
plaintiffs' accident or under the CJ5 tests shown in Mr.
Anderson's films.
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AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of plaintiffs' Mr.
Noettl was similarly restricted by the trial court.

Mr.

Noettl testified, on direct examination by plaintiffs1
counsel, that "it was very difficult to turn a passenger car
over."

(T., 10/26/83, at 1262; R. 3039).

To test Mr.

Noettl f s knowledge about rolling passenger cars, AMC/Jeep
asked him: "What experience have you had in trying to roll
over a passenger vehicle."
court stated:

Plaintiffs objected and the trial

"I don't want to get into testing all other

kinds of vehicles, because we've got enough problems with
one.

vSo, I'm going to sustain the objection."

1266; R. 3043)(emphasis added).

(Id., at

AMC/Jeep also asked Mr.

Noettl whether he thought some other vehicle would have come
but of plaintiffs' accident unscathed, but the trial court
sustained plaintiffs' objection to that question as well.
(Id., at 1275; R. 3052).
The practical effect of the trial court's restriction of appellants' right of cross-examination was to allow
plaintiffs' theory of the case to go unchallenged.
Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify repeatedly and
without foundation that "Jeeps" performed poorly in
comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was prohibited
from exploring the basis for that comparison.

The trial

court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of
plaintiffs' experts was, therefore, reversible error.
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In State v, Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630
(1953), this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court
based, in part, on the trial court's erroneous limitation on
cross-examination, stating that "[t]here is no other
instrument so well adapted to discovery of the truth as
cross-examination, and so long as it tends to disclose the
truth it should never be curtailed or limited."
at 637.

265 P. 2d,

"It is fundamental that once a witness testifies as

an expert, he subjects himself to the most rigid kind of
cross-examination, including searching questions concerning
his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge, and the
basis of his opinion", Ross v. Colorado National Bank of
Denver, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P. 2d 882, 887 (1969), and "unduly
harsh limitation on cross-examination can amount to
prejudicial error."

N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele

Waarden v. A.0. Smith Corp., 590 F. 2d 415, 421 (2nd Cir.
1978).

Accord In re Compensation of Bales, 294 Or. 224, 656

P. 2d 300, 306 n.4 (1982); Samuel v. Vanderheiden, 277 Or.
239, 560 P. 2d 636, 639 (1977); Bott v. Wendler, 203 Kan.
212, 453 P. 2d 100 (1969); Hope v. Arrowhead and Puritas
Waters, Inc., 344 P. 2d 428, 433 (Cal. App. 1959); Brazee v.
Morris, 65 Ariz. 291, 179 P. 2d 442, 444 (1947).
The recent case of Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich,
580 P. 2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), has particular significance when
compared to the facts in this case.

The plaintiff in
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Todorovich was injured while driving an automobile manufactured by the defendant and the plaintiff's theory was that he
was injured due to a defectively designed seat in the
automobile.

At trial, the plaintiff's expert testified with

respect to the failure of the automobile seat and to alternative safer designs and methods of construction.

When the

defendant attempted to inquire on cross-examination about
federal seat design standards, however, the line of questions
was blocked by the trial court.

On appeal, the Wyoming

Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, in
part on the basis of the trial court's limitation of the
defendant's cross-examination, stating:
At this point in the trial counsel for
Chrysler was confronted with the problem
of cross-examination of an expert witness
for the plaintiff who had stated his
opinion as to the proper method of
designing and manufacturing the part that
failed. ... Fairness to Chrysler in such
a situation demands that it be afforded
reasonable opportunity to test by searching questions the knowledge, competency
and qualifications of such an expert
witness. ... Having offered his expert
opinion the expert witness exposes himself to interrogation which ordinarily
would have no place in the cross-examination of a factual witness, but the expert
exposes himself to the most searching
kind of investigation into his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge and
the reasons for his opinion, including
the facts and oth£r matter upon which it
is based.
580 P.2d, at 1133 (emphasis added).
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The facts in this case closely parallel the facts
in Todorovich.

Plaintiffs' experts repeatedly expressed

their opinion that "Jeeps" rolled over in situations where
other automobiles would not.

Yet, in virtually every

instance where AMC/Jeep attempted to cross-examine on this
point, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objections.
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts was
erroneously curtailed by the trial court and its judgment
should accordingly be reversed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING
SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF
AMC/JEEP'S EVIDENCE.
The first two Points in this brief illustrate the
unfair advantage accorded plaintiffs by the trial court in
permitting them to introduce irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence and then blocking AMC/Jeep's cross-examination
with respect to that evidence.

Compounding those errors and

removing any vestige of fundamental fairness from the proceedings, however, the trial court then systematically barred
the introduction by AMC/Jeep of virtually all of its
demonstrative evidence offered to rebut the unfounded implications raised by plaintiffs' experts.
The trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's evidence
is as startling as it is unprecedented.

Before AMC/Jeep even

called its first engineering expert, the trial court heard,
in chambers, plaintiffs' objections to two films that would
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be offered in conjunction with that expert's testimony.
AMC/Jeep's expert, Edward Heitzman, whose extensive experience in the field of automotive safety and design made
him singularly qualified to testify regarding the comparisons
and tests relied upon so heavily by plaintiffs, intended to
rebut plaintiffs1 evidence, suggesting that the Commando is
unsafe because CJ5s rolled over in plaintiffs' films, by
exhibiting films of a Jeep CJ5 undergoing certain maneuvers
and remaining upright.

The purpose of the films was to

illustrate Mr. Heitzman's testimony: (1) that the tests
depicted in plaintiffs' films did not represent realistic
emergency driving conditions; (2) that the mechanically
induced conditions reflected in plaintiffs' films would not
be duplicated by a human driver; and (3) that the CJ5 is in
fact a stable vehicle which can successfully negotiate
realistic emergency conditions.

When questioned by the trial

court as to the materiality of the films, counsel for
AMC/Jeep responded:
The materiality, your Honor, is that in
the course of this trial, the plaintiffs
have challenged the handling qualities of
the Jeep CJ5. And they say that it's an
unstable vehicle. And we think that this
test demonstrates graphically to the jury
that it's not an unstable vehicle, it can
do very vigorous maneuvers and do that
maneuver successfully.
(Ijd., at 1565; R. 3347).

AMC/Jeep explained that it was not

admitting that tests of the CJ5 were relevant to the issue of
the Commando's characteristics, but rather offered the tests
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to rebut evidence suggesting that the CJ5 was an unstable
vehicle.

(ixl., at 1566; R. 3348). 5

The trial court

ruled that defendants1 films of the CJ5 were not admissible,
however.

(id.., at 1571; R. 3353).

Mr. Heitzman1 s second

film demonstrated that virtually any vehicle will roll over
when subjected to the conditions depicted in plaintiffs'
films.
Stripped of his demonstrative evidence, Mr.
Heitzman nevertheless took the witness stand, (id., at 1577;
R. 3359), and through his testimony attempted to rebut plaintiffs' films.

Mr. Heitzman's testimony was severely and

unquestionably undermined, however, by his inability to
demonstrate his opinions with his own CJ5 films.
AMC/Jeep next attempted to rebut the testimony of
plaintiffs' expert with respect to plaintiffs' film showing a
Commando, equipped with "outriggers", undergoing certain
tests, and Mr. Anderson's testimony for the plaintiffs that,
but for the outriggers, the Commando in the film would have
rolled over.

(T., 10/28/83, 918-926; R. 2698-2706).

Mr.

Heitzman testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Anderson's film

If one party is permitted to introduce irrelevant and
therefore inadmissible evidence, the general rule "is that
the opponent may reply with similar evidence whenever it is
needed for removing an unfair prejudice which might otherwise
have ensued from the original evidence." Wigmore on
Evidence, Section 15, pp. 304-307. See also, Dewey "v. Funk,
211 Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722, 724-726 (1973); Wynn v. Sundquist,
485 P.2d 1085, 1090-1091 (Or. 1971); Mills v. Memphis Sales
Manufacturing Co. , 251 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Miss". 1966).
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of the specially equipped Commando did not illustrate situations in which the Commando would have rolled.

An expert's

eye and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers would have rolled over but for the outriggers, (id.,
1744; R. 3527), and Mr. Heitzman testified that, in fact, the
Commando shown in Mr. Anderson's film would not have rolled
over had the outriggers not been attached.

(T., 10/28/83,

1674-1676; R. 3457-3459).
The basis for Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard
was the fact that the outriggers on plaintiffs' Commando were
set too low, preventing that vehicle from even approaching a
situation in which actual roll-over would have occurred.

To

demonstrate Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard, AMC/jeep
attempted to introduce a film of its own showing certain
vehicles undergoing test maneuvers with outriggers attached,
more appropriately, far enough off the ground so that when
the roll-over was induced the viewer could see quite clearly
the point at which the outriggers actually prevented the
roll-over from occurring.

The introduction of this film was

likewise blocked by the trial court, however, in spite of the
fact that Mr. Heitzman was later cross-examined extensively
with respect to his judgment that plaintiffs' film did not
demonstrate a Commando rolling over, (Icl., 1824; R. 3607),
and Mr. Heitzman's ability to respond to such crossexamination was seriously undermined by the trial court's
exclusion of the outrigger film.
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AMC/Jeep also intended to utilize the outrigger
film to rebut plaintiffs1 evidence that "Jeeps" are more
likely to roll over in emergency situations than "other
vehicles."

AMC/Jeep especially needed this film to

illustrate Mr. Heitzman1s point that many vehicles will roll
over when subjected to the mechanically induced tests
illustrated in plaintiffs1 films.

Indeed, it was absolutely

essential to AMC/Jeep's defense of plaintiffs' products
liability claim that it be permitted to show that the
Commando, in fact, compared favorably to other vehicles.

The

film was excluded by the trial court, however, "because it's
irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because they involve other
vehicles which the jury would have to take into consideration
as to how it was done, the comparisons, the whole works."
(Id., 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-3530, 3533).

The trial court

thus refused to permit Mr. Heitzman to rebut the testimony of
plaintiffs' experts with his own films even though
plaintiffs' experts had been allowed to illustrate their
opinions with extremely graphic and prejudicial films showing
clothed dummies being thrown from vehicles during
mechanically induced maneuvers incapable of being duplicated
by human beings in realistic emergency situations.

The

distinct impression left with the jury, later capitalized on
by opposing counsel during closing argument, was that
AMC/Jeep did not have any demonstrative evidence to rebut or
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even answer the several films presented by plaintiffs'
experts.
AMC/Jeep made one last attempt to present its case
by calling Dr. Charles Warner, a mechanical engineer and
consultant, to testify about the motion of the accident
vehicle and of plaintiffs therein during the course of the
accident made the basis of this lawsuit, and to give an
opinion regarding the design of the Commando.
1829; R. 3612).

(T., 10/28/83,

Specifically, it was Dr. Warner's opinion

that the Commando was not defective and that its design did
not cause plaintiffs' accident or injuries.

(1^., at 1873-

1874; R. 3656-3657).
Dr. Warner had studied the actual accident vehicle
and the accident scene extensively and offered his opinion as
to the probable movement of the Commando during the course of
plaintiffs' accident.
3741).

In addition,

vehicles —

(T., 10/31/83, 1941-1954; R. 3728Dr. Warner had also obtained exemplar

a Commando and an Oldsmobile similar to the

automobile driven by defendant Larry Anderson which struck
plaintiffs' Commando from the rear —

and had performed

certain tests with those vehicles in an attempt to
reconstruct plaintiffs' accident.

(Ld., at 1937-1938; R.

3724-3725).
A critical aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs' bodies during
the course of the accident.

It was Dr. Warner's opinion that
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plaintiffs' movement within the vehicle during the course of
the accident, rather than the fact that the vehicle happened
to be a Commando, actually caused plaintiff Steven
Whitehead's injury.

(.Id., 1957-1967; R. 3744-3754).

Dr.

Warner had taken a series of photographs depicting human
beings sitting in the exemplar vehicle, a Commando, and
positioning themselves as Dr. Warner testified plaintiffs
were most probably positioned during the course of the
accident.

The photographs were essential to the jury's

understanding of Dr. Warner's testimony.

The trial court

nevertheless excluded the photographs on the basis "that they
have no probative value, that the probative value is limited
at least because of the photographs not being representative
of just what did happen to the vehicles."
3754).

(rd., at 1967; R.

Of course, this was the same objection made by

AMC/Jeep with respect to virtually all of plaintiffs'
demonstrative evidence, but it was only when AMC/Jeep attempted to present its own case that the trial court suddenly
became concerned that the demonstrative evidence represent
"just what did happen to the vehicles."

(See also Id., at

2009-2011; R. 3797-3799).
Dr. Warner was also prepared to demonstrate his
testimony regarding occupant movement and damage during a
rollover with a film showing several vehicles rolling over.
(Ixi., at 1985; R. 3773).
as well.

The trial court excluded this film

(Id., at 1986; R. 3774).
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Dr^ Warner also testified that plaintiffs' injuries
were due, in part, to the fact that their Commando had been
involved in a prior accident which had compromised the integrity of the Commando's passenger compartment and had
aggravated the injuries suffered by plaintiffs.
2024; R. 3812).

(_Id., at

Dr. Warner had personally examined the

accident vehicle before reaching this conclusion and had,
thereafter, prepared an exhibit to demonstrate his testimony
in this regard.

The trial court sustained plaintiffs' objec-

tion to this exhibit as well.

(j[d., at 2026; R. 3814).

AMC/Jeep's final attempt to present demonstrative
evidence to the jury was in the form of a film prepared by
Dr. Warner of an exemplar vehicle, a Commando, undergoing
certain tests and maneuvers with outriggers attached.

The

film had obvious probative value and would have been used to
rebut the testimony elicited by plaintiffs in connection with
the film of their exemplar.

(id., at 1973; R. 3781).

The

trial court excluded the defendants' film, however, stating
only that "I believe that [it] is not probative of any issues
except perhaps the test which was made ...."
3774).

(I_d., 1986; R.

The trial court's statement is simply inexplicable in

light of the fact that plaintiffs had previously been allowed
to introduce a film of their own exemplar Commando.
The foregoing catalogue of the trial court's exclusion of virtually all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence
illustrates plainly the unfair advantage granted by the trial
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court to the plaintiffs in this case.

Not only were plain-

tiffs permitted to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory
demonstrative evidence, not only was AMC/Jeep precluded by
the trial court from cross-examining plaintiffs' witnesses
with respect to that evidence, but also when AMC/Jeep attempted to rebut plaintiffs' case it was forced to do so
without the aid of its films and other demonstrative
evidence.
^•

AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence Should have
been Admitted to Rebut Plaintiffs' Irrelevant
Evidence.

The limitations imposed by the trial court on the
testimony of AMC/Jeep's experts was prejudicial error requiring reversal of the judgment against AMC/Jeep.

Virtually all

of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence would have been used to
rebut the theory, never proven, but so graphically implied by
plaintiffs' films and the trial court's erroneous admission
thereof:

that all "Jeeps" are the same, that "Jeeps," as a

generic type of vehicle, roll over much more frequently than
other vehicles, and that the Commando is consequently a
defective vehicle.

AMC/Jeep's films would have shown (1)

that Jeeps remain upright when subjected to realistic
emergency situations; (2) that plaintiffs' film of their
exemplar Commando did not illustrate a roll-over of that
vehicle; and (3) that plaintiffs' tests of CJ5s undergoing
mechanically induced maneuvers were unrealistic and
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misleading in that they demonstrated test maneuvers few
vehicles could perform successfully.

The admission of

AMC/Jeepfs films was essential if AMC/Jeep was to have any
hope of rebutting the evidence that had erroneously been
admitted by the trial court during plaintiffs1 case in chief.

AMC/Jeep's rebuttal evidence was admissible under
the rule, stated at note 5, supra, that if one party is
permitted to introduce irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible evidence, his opponent may reply with similar evidence
to remove any prejudice which might have ensued from the
original evidence.

The exclusion of defendants' films was,

therefore, reversible error.
In Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Company, Inc., 487
F. 2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 415 U.S. 978 (1974),
the plaintiff sued the defendant, on a strict liability
theory, for an injury incurred when her hand was crushed in a
machine manufactured by the defendant.

As in this case, the

plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant's machine was
more dangerous than other such machines and the defendant
presented contrary evidence that its machine met the standards of the industry.

On appeal the Seventh Circuit found

the admission of the defendant's evidence proper on the
ground that "[t]he plaintiff opened this matter during the
presentation of her case in chief.

Having done so, she

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cannot complain of [defendant's] attempt at rebuttal."

487

F. 2d, at 600.
The settled rule that "[a] party eliciting evidence
cannot object to the same kind of evidence introduced on
behalf of the other party," Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or. 71,
559 P. 2d 1275 (1977), has been expressed in many contexts
substantially similar to this case.

The plaintiff in C.F.

Church v. Golden, 429 P. 2d 771 (Okla. 1967), for example,
was burned when his toilet seat, manufactured by the defendant, caught on fire.

It was the plaintiff's theory that the

toilet seat was defectively designed making it highly flammable and the plaintiff's experts testified regarding experiments performed on similar toilet seats.

The defendant's

experts then testified about similar experiments which they
had performed and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant.

The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the

experiments performed by the defendants' experts should not
have been admitted.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed,

however, stating:
Plaintiffs entire case was predicated on
the theory that the covering on the
toilet in question contained a highly
inflammable chemical known as cellulose
nitrate. He offered testimony of experts
regarding experiments made in substantially the same manner as those made by
defendant's experts. Under such circumstances it was not error to admit the
evidence of defendant's experts on the
point.
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429 P. 2d, at 775.

See also Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling

and Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P. 2d 619 (1969);
Leger Construction, Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P. 2d 212,
214-215 (Utah 1976) .
In each of the cases cited above, as in this case,
the plaintiff introduced expert testimony and demonstrative
evidence tending to prove his theory that the defendant's
product was defective, and in each of these cases the appellate court found that the defendant must be permitted to
rebut such evidence by introducing similar tests of his own.
The common sense rule enunciated in these cases underscores
AMC/Jeep's argument that its tests of CJ5s and of the exemplar Commando, as well as all of its other demonstrative
evidence, should not have been excluded by the trial court
once plaintiffs had opened the door to such testimony in
their own case in chief.
B.

AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence was Relevant
to Show the State-of-the-Art.

Even had plaintiffs not "opened the door" to the
issue of industry standards with respect to roll-over characteristics, AMC/Jeepfs evidence was admissible under settled
principles of products liability law.

As the Court stated in

Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442, 447 (10th Cir.
1976):

n

[T]here is 'general1 agreement that to prove

liability under Section 402A [Restatement (Second) of Torts]
the plaintiff must show that the product was dangerous beyond
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the expectation of the ordinary customer.

State-of-art

evidence helps to determine the expectation of the ordinary
consumer.

A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the

safety features which are incorporated in automobiles today."
This Court adopted Section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of Torts, in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel
Co., 601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979), and courts in other states
that have adopted this standard agree that "state-of-the-art"
or "industry standards" evidence is relevant in design defect
cases like this one.

The court in Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.

v. Day, 594 P. 2d 38 (Alaska 1979) cert, denied 454 U.S. 894
(1981), stated, for example, that "[w]hile not, strictly
speaking, a defense in a products liability action, state of
the art may be considered in determining whether a product is
defective."

594 P. 2d, at 45.

See Traynor, The Ways and

Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.
L. Rev. 363, 367, 370 (1967).
Similarly, in Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697
F. 2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982), a products liability case

Some courts exclude evidence of the state of the art in
manufacturing defect cases because the plaintiff in such
cases need only show that the product does not conform to the
manufacturer's specifications to prove it is defective. See
Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F. 2d 112, 115
(4th Cir. 1981). When the issue is a defect in design,
however, state of the art evidence is generally held to be
admissible. Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F. 2d
1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1982); Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.
2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976).
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under Section 402A, the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries
when their mobile home, manufactured by the defendant, burst
into flames.

The plaintiffs in Reed, like plaintiffs in this

case, offered evidence that their motor home was more
dangerous than motor homes manufactured by other companies.
The defendant then sought to rebut this evidence, as AMC/Jeep
did in this case, by offering evidence that its motor home
was as safe as other motor homes.

The defendant's state-of-

the-art evidence was admitted by the trial court, and the
plaintiffs appealed after the jury returned a verdict against
them.

The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's state-

of-the-art evidence was properly admitted stating:
[T]he majority rule is that state of the
art evidence is admissible in design
defect cases. ... Section 402A and the
South Carolina Courts require the plaintiff to show both that the product is
defective and that it is 'unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer or user given
the conditions and circumstances that
foreseeably attend use of the product.'
The majority of courts have found in
design defect cases, as opposed to
manufacturing defect cases, that state of
the art and industry standards are
relevant to show both the reasonableness
of the design and that the product was
dangerous beyond the expectations of the
ordinary consumer.
697 F. 2d, at 1196 (citations omitted).

See Porter v.

American Optical Corp., 641 F. 2d 1123, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981)
(applying Louisiana law), cert, denied 454 U.S. 1109 (1981);
Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 134 Ariz. 208, 655 P.
2d 32, 36 (1932) .
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This case, like the cases cited above, is a design
defect case.

This Court, like the courts quoted above, has

adopted Section 402A requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the product in question is both defective and unreasonably
dangerous.

The rule stated in these cases is, therefore,

persuasive, and the trial court's exclusion of all AMC/Jeep
evidence relating to the state-of-the-art was erroneous both
because such evidence would have rebutted similar evidence
presented by plaintiffs and because such evidence was independently relevant to AMC/Jeep's' defense that the Commando
in question was neither defectively designed nor unreasonably
dangerous.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER
A MISTRIAL BASED ON IMPROPER CLOSING
ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING COUNSEL.
As reflected in the preceding sections of this
Brief, the trial court blocked virtually every attempt by
AMC/Jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts and to rebut
the evidence offered by those experts tending to suggest that
the Commando in this case was defective and unreasonably
dangerous resulting in the injuries sustained by plaintiffs.
Without doubt, AMC/Jeep possessed and offered the demonstrative evidence to rebut the testimony of plaintiffs' experts,
but the trial court excluded virtually all that evidence on
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the objection of opposing counsel.

It was, therefore, im-

proper and prejudicial for opposing counsel to argue during
closing arguments to the jury:
positive proof. None at all."

(1) that AMC/Jeep had "No
(T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4582);

(2) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all,"
(.id., at 33; R. 4583), and (3) that AMC/Jeep's experts failed
to bring "an ounce of engineering data."
4585).

(^Id., at 35; R.

Opposing counsel (in this instance, counsel for Larry

Anderson, building upon the improper arguments of plaintiffs'
counsel) reached the height of impropriety when he made the
following statement to the jury:
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing
exactly what they had done, even to the
height of the outriggers off the ground;
why didn't they go out and test a
Commando, put some outriggers on there
and go do some testing of their own? Why
didn't they come in here and tell you,
'We have done the same kind of tests that
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same
number of degrees of steer in on a
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell
you why: They are afraid to do it. They
didn't dare do it. Because they knew
that Commando would turn over.
(Id.., at 109; R. 4659).

Of course, AMC/Jeep had put outrig-

gers on a Commando and offered films of the tests conducted
on that Commando, but those films were excluded by the trial
court on the basis of objections from opposing counsel.
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It requires no authority to establish that lawyers
have a duty to present their case to a jury without misstating material facts or relying on facts not in evidence.
Professional conduct, as well as fundamental notions of fair
play and justice, require that counsel refrain from the type
of misrepresentation made by opposing counsel in this case.
The court in State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P. 2d 277,
280 (Idaho App. 1983), recently quoted with approval the
following statement of the rule from the American Bar
Association Standards, The Defense Function Section 7.8(a)
(1971):
In closing argument to the jury the
lawyer may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.
It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer
intentionally to misstate the evidence or
mislead the jury as to the inferences it
may draw.

There are often circumstances in which
counsel may be entitled to argue to the
jury that they should draw an inference
adverse to the prosecution as the result
of its failure to bring forth some particular item of evidence or to call as a
witness someone who has a special relation to the facts of the case. But it is
a form of misrepresentation, and therefore improper, for counsel to argue that
the evidence was not presented because it
had been excluded by the court or is
inadmissible. A lawyer who has successfully urged the court to exclude evidence
should not be allowed to point to the
absence of that evidence to create an
inference that it does not exist.
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(Emphasis added); see also Pritchard v. State, 673 P. 2d 29i;
294 n.l (Alaska App. 1983) (Singleton, J.# dissenting); Rizzo
v. United States, 304 F. 2d 810, 829 (8th Cir. 1962).
That rule is directly applicable here.

Opposing

counsel knew that AMC/Jeep had offered a film showing a
Commando undergoing extreme turning maneuvers and not rolling
over.

Counsel also knew that AMC/Jeep had offered extensive

additional demonstrative evidence to support its case.
Counsel knew this because they had viewed such evidence in
chambers at the time it was excluded by the trial court at
their instance.

It was, therefore, misleading and

plainly

improper to argue that AMC/Jeep failed to bring "an ounce of
engineering data" or that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to offer such
evidence.
In the context of this trial, opposing counsels1
closing arguments were extremely prejudicial.
recently stated:

As this Court

"The proper remedy for prejudicial attorney

misconduct is to order a new trial."
P. 2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982).

Nelson v. Trujillo, 657

This is precisely the remedy

sought by AMC/Jeep in this appeal.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL
EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE PRESENCE OF
AND PLAINTIFFS1 FAILURE TO UTILIZE
AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs' Commando was
equipped with seat belts and that plaintiffs were not wearing
their seat belts at the time of the accident.

Prior to
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trial, however, plaintiffs submitted a Motion in Limine "to
preclude the defendants or their witnesses or attorneys from
mentioning the subject of seat belts or the use or nonuse of
seatbelts at the trial of this case."

(R. 1274-1294).

AMC/Jeep submitted an opposing memorandum, (R. 1425-1464),
and the trial court heard argument on the question of the
admissibility of seat belt evidence, in various contexts,
throughout the trial.

In each instance, however, AMC/Jeep

was precluded from introducing evidence on the availability
and plaintiffs1 non-use of their seat belts.
Initially, the trial court ruled that, at least for
opening statements, neither party could refer "to 'seat
belts' or the availability, or the lack thereof, or the lack
of use thereof."

(T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial,

10/18/83, at 156; R. 4959).

Later that same day, and in the

face of plaintiffs' basic theory that the Commando was defectively designed by AMC/Jeep and was, therefore, unreasonably
dangerous, the trial court ruled that the fact that plaintiffs had access to seat belts would not be admitted to show
that the Commando was properly designed.

(T., 10/18/83, at

12; R. 1763).
The trial court subsequently compounded its erroneous exclusion of seat belt evidence, however, when it
ruled that AMC/Jeep could not cross-examine plaintiffs'
experts with respect to the presence of seat belts in the
accident vehicle, even though those experts were testifying
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that the Commando was an unsafe vehicle.

(T., Abstracts from

Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, at 88; R. 4891).

Finally, a

proffer was made to the trial court by AMC/Jeep's expert
witness, Dr. Warner, that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead
"been using the seat belt in all probability he would not
have received the spinal injury that he did receive."
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806).

(T.,

The trial court, nevertheless,

ruled that no evidence regarding seat belts would be admitted
in the trial, summarizing the basis for its ruling as
follows:
"[T]o speculate what the seat belt might
have done in this type of situation is
just something that the jury ought not
to, and they will not have, under my
ruling, the obligation to consider. ...
Therefore, there will be no more evidence
in this case with regard to seat belts.
I want everybody to leave it alone, and
we'll go from there."
(.Id., at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808).

The trial courtf s exclu-

sion of all evidence relating to the presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seat belts was prejudicial error.
A

•

Plaintiffs* Failure to Utilize Available Seat
Belts Contributed to their Injuries, and
Constituted a Failure to Mitigate their
Damages.

The trial court's exclusion of any evidence relating to plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts
was error.

Although this Court has yet to rule on the issue,

the so-called "seat belt defense" has been accepted in a
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substantial number of jurisdictions that have addressed the
question.
In Utah, it is proper for the jury to consider the
faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they "have united
as concurrent proximate causes of an injury11 in strict
liability cases.

Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d

1301, 1303 (1981).

AMC/Jeep's experts were prepared to

testify that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead been wearing his
seat belt at the time of the accident "he would not have
received the spinal injury that he did receive."
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806).

(T.,

AMC/jeep would have offered

further evidence that plaintiffs1 failure to utilize the
available seat belts was a breach of plaintiffs1 duty "to use
the degree of care which an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent
person would have observed for his own safety under the
circumstances."

Lindquist v. Kennecott Copper Company, Inc.,

30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P. 2d 1182, 1185 (1973).
It is difficult to deny that, in the current
climate of consumer awareness and in light of repeated
government and industry-sponsored campaigns urging citizens
to "buckle up for safety," a reasonably prudent person acts
unreasonably when he fails to use an available seat belt
before venturing onto the highways.

One commentator has

noted the objective fact that "the use of seat belts would
reduce serious injuries resulting from automobile accidents
by thirty-three percent, and could save up to twelve thousand
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lives annually."

Note, The Seat Belt Defense:

A

Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested
Approach for the Courts, 56 Notre Dame Lawyer 272, 281
(1980).

The court in the seminal case of Bentzler v. Braun,

34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626, 640 (1967), put it this way:
"On the basis of ... experience, and as a matter of common
knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or
should know of the additional safety factor produced by the
use of seat belts."
From the common sense proposition that it may be
unreasonable for one to fail to use available seat belts, it
is properly within the jury's purview to determine whether
the plaintiff in a particular case has met his duty of due
care.

As the court noted in Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill.App.

2d 1, 234 N.E. 2d 329, 331 (1968):
The use, or non-use of seat belts, and
expert testimony, if any, in relation
thereto, is a circumstance which the
trier of facts may consider, together
with all other facts in evidence, in
arriving at its conclusion as to whether
the plaintiff has exercised due care, not
only to avoid injury to himself, but to
mitigate any injury he would likely
sustain.
See also Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444, 323 N.E. 2d 164,
167 (1974).

Under these settled principles, and under the

rule announced by this Court in Mulherin, the trial court
should have admitted AMC/Jeep's evidence and expert testimony
to prove that plaintiff Steven Whitehead's failure to utilize
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his seat belt "united" with any fault of AMC/Jeep "as concurrent and proximate causes of" his injury.
Courts which do not subscribe to this Court's view,
as

expressed in Mulherin, that comparative fault principles

may apply to a strict products liability case, prefer to
classify a plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts as a
breach of the duty to mitigate damages.

The language most

often quoted in this regard is as follows:

As Prosser has indicated, the plaintiff's
duty to mitigate his damages is equivalent to the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which precludes recovery for any
damages which could have been eliminated
by reasonable conduct on the part of the
plaintiff (Prosser, Torts [4th ed.J,
Section 65, pp. 422-424). Traditionally
both of these concepts have been applied
only to postaccident conduct, such as a
plaintiff's failure to obtain medical
treatment after he has sustained an
injury. To do otherwise, it has been
argued, would impose a preaccident
obligation upon the plaintiff and would
deny him the right to assume the due care
of others (Kleist, Seat Belt Defense —
An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 Hastings
L.J. 613, 616). We concede that the
opportunity to mitigate damages prior to
the occurrence of an accident does not
ordinarily arise, and that the
chronological distinction, on which the
concept of mitigation of damages rests,
is justified in most cases. However, in
our opinion, the seat belt affords the
automobile occupant an unusual and ordinarily unavailable means by which he or
she may minimize his or her damages prior
to the accident. Highway safety has
become a national concern; we are told to
drive defensively and to 'watch out for
the other driver'. When an automobile
occupant may readily protect himself, at
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least partially, from the consequences of
a collision, we think that the burden of
buckling an available seat belt may,
under the facts of the particular case,
be found by the jury to be less than the
likelihood of injury when multiplied by
its accompanying severity*
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168.

This view is supported

by Section 465, comment c, Restatement (Second) of Torts,
dealing with the causal relation between harm and plaintiff's
fault, which states that damages may be apportioned
where the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff is found not to contribute in
any way to the original accident or
injury, but to be a substantial contributing factor in increasing the harm
which ensues. There must of course be
satisfactory evidence to support such a
finding, and the court may properly
refuse to permit the apportionment on the
basis of mere speculation.
Pursuant to this rule, courts will admit evidence
of nonuse of seatbelts when the defendant can demonstrate, by
competent and satisfactory evidence, the extent that the
plaintiff's injuries could have been avoided by wearing a
seat belt.

Garrett v. Desa Industries, Inc., 705 F. 2d 721,

725 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v.

Volkswagen of America, Inc.,

445 F. Supp 1368, 1372-1373 (E.D. Va. 1978); Insurance
Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 52 U.S.L.W. 2598
(Florida Supreme Court; April 12, 1984);

Spier v. Barker,

363 N.E. 2d, at 166.
Whether viewed as a species of comparative fault
under Mulherin or as a failure to mitigate damages, the jury

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in this case should have been permitted to consider the fact
of plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts.
Acceptance of the so-called "seat belt defense" will not
undermine in any way the rights of plaintiffs to recover for
injuries caused them by others.
recovery in and of itself.

The defense is not a bar to

The burden remains on the

defendant to prove, first, that it was unreasonable for the
plaintiff not to use a seat belt, and, second, that the
plaintiff would not have received some or all of his injuries
had he used the seat belt.

Only if AMC/Jeep were able to

convince the jury of both prongs of its defense would the
jury have reduced plaintiff Steven Whitehead's recovery by an
appropriate amount.
B.

The Jury Should have been Permitted to
Consider the Fact that the Commando was
Equipped with Seat Belts.

AMC/Jeep was also denied any opportunity to present
evidence of the simple fact that the Commando in this case
was equipped with seat belts.

Such evidence would have been

presented separately from evidence of plaintiffs' nonuse of
the seat belts and would have been utilized to show that the
Commando was designed safely and properly.
The case of Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978), is directly on point.

As

in this case, the plaintiff in Wilson was injured when his
vehicle overturned during an accident.

As in this case, the
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plaintiff asserted that his vehicle was defective in design
because the roof collapsed during the rollover causing a compression fracture of his spine.

As in this case, the defen-

dant sought to introduce evidence that the vehicle was
equipped with seat belts in order to defend the "whole
automobile•"
The court in Wilson, however, admitted the defendant's evidence that the accident vehicle had been equipped
with seat belts for the purpose of determining whether the
automobile was defectively designed, relying upon the simple
and logical proposition that the jury would have to determine
"whether the auto as a whole was defective and unreasonably
dangerous",

445 F. Supp. at 1371, and that the jury could

not properly fulfill its function in this regard if it was
not permitted to take into consideration the presence of a
safety device, seat belts, that were designed to restrain the
plaintiff and prevent, or at least minimize, injury.
As in Wilson, the trial court in this case should
have permitted the jury to consider the presence of seat
belts in the Commando.

As in Wilson, plaintiffs in this case

claim that the Commando, the "whole vehicle," is defective
because it rolled over and collapsed upon them.

AMC/Jeep's

evidence would have shown that the seat belts were installed
to guard against this type of injury, among others, and that
the Commando was rendered safer by the presence of the seat
belts.
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The relevance of evidence of the availability of
seat belts to the issue of the Commando's design cannot be
doubted•

The trial court's ruling in this case, however,

restricted the jury unduly and permitted it to consider only
a part of the Commando in deciding whether the Commando, as a
"whole vehicle," was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
The result was absurd and prejudicially erroneous for it is
impossible to design a "crashworthy" vehicle which will
protect its occupants from serious injury in the event of an
accident without including in that design the most fundamental safety feature of all —

seat belts.

The judgment of the

trial court must therefore be reversed.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
JEEP CORPORATION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER TO
INCLUDE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
AND IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF AMC/JEEP BASED ON SUCH DEFENSE.
Plaintiffs named American Motors Sales Corporation
and Jeep Corporation as defendants in their Second Amended
Complaint filed July 31, 1980.

(R. 84-87).

Defendant Jeep

Corporation answered on November 11, 1980 (113-114).
Defendant American Motors Sales Corporation answered, on
September 12, 1983.

(R. 993-995).

The critical difference

between the two answers was that the answer of American
Motors Sales Corporation contained the following defense:
"The complaint is barred by Section 78-15-3, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended."

(R. 994). On September 12, 1983,
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the same day the Answer of American Motors Sales Corporation
was filed, Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for leave
to amend its answer to include a defense based on Section 7815-3 (R. 983-989).

The trial court denied the motion "on the

basis that the motion was not timely made, the amendment of
the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of
the trial date which the Court feels is unjustified under the
facts and circumstances."

(R. 1271-1272).

After trial had

been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved for a directed verdict based
on Section 73-15-3.

It was pointed out to the trial court

that this defense had been pleaded by American Motors Sales
Corporation in its initial pleading, but the trial court
denied the motion.
A.

(T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775).

The Trial Court Should Have Granted Jeep
Corporation's Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule
15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for permission to amend its answer to assert a defense based on Section
78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated.

That section provides that

products liability actions are barred if brought "more than
six years after the date of initial purchase for use or
consumption...."
Plaintiffs1 Commando was manufactured by Jeep
Corporation in December, 1971 (T., 10/25/83, at 930;
R. 2710), for sale by American Motors Sales Corporation
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during the 1972 model year.
October 6, 1979 —

Plaintiffs' accident occurred on

more than six years after the date the

Commando was initially purchased.

AMC/Jeep contends that

plaintiffs' accident occurred "more than six years after the
date of initial purchase for use or consumption" and their
claims are thus barred by the terms of Section 78-15-3.

This

defense raises a purely legal question based on undisputed
facts and was raised contemporaneously by the Answer of
American Motors Sales Corporation.

The trial court should

have granted Jeep Corporation's Motion to Amend under the
liberal standards of Rule 15(a).
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party in the circumstances presented by this case, and that "leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires."

In Lewis v.

Moultree, 627 P. 2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that
"[t]he rule in this state has always been to allow amendments
freely where justice requires, and especially is this true
before trial."
486 P. 2d 1045,

(Quoting Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165,
(1971) (emphasis in original)).

In the

same case, this Court clarified the "justice" which the
liberal amendment rule is meant to further:
Some tempest has been raised about the
court allowing the plaintiff to make
tardy amendments to pleadings. In doing
so, he [the trial judge] wisely and
properly stated: 'the pleadings are
never more important than the cause that
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is before the court ...• There can be no
prejudice in this case because we'll give
ample time to answer . ..." This is in
harmony with what we regard as the correct policy: of recognizing the
desirability of the pleadings setting
forth definitely framed issues, but also
of permitting amendment where the interest of justice so requires, and the
adverse party is given a fair opportunity
to meet it.
627 P. 2d, at 98 (emphasis added), quoting Thomas J. Peck &
Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.
2d 446 (1973) .
The trial court's denial of Jeep Corporation's
Motion to Amend ignores this Court's liberal construction of
Rule 15(a).

Most importantly, the trial court's statement,

in its order denying the Motion to Amend, that

,f

the amendment

of the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of
the trial date" is plainly belied by the fact that American
Motors Sales Corporation interposed precisely the same
defense in its Answer.

(R. 994).

It can hardly be said that

any party would have been prejudiced by Jeep Corporation's
interposing a defense that was properly and contemporaneously
interposed in the answer of American Motors Sales
Corporation.

The issue was before the trial court and

"justice required" that Jeep Corporation be allowed to amend
its answer so that it might accord with the answer of its
affiliated corporation.
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Eastridge v. Fruehauf Corporation, 52 F.R.D. 129
(W.D. Ky. 1971) (applying Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which is identical to the Utah rule), demonstrates
the proper approach to a motion to amend an answer to add a
statute of limitations defense.

The plaintiff in Eastridge

sued the defendant for personal injuries allegedly incurred
on account of the defendant's negligence.

Sometime after he

had filed his original answer, the defendant moved the trial
court for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) so that he
might add a defense based on a statute of limitations.
trial court granted the Motion to Amend, and noted the
following:
Statute of limitations are designed
primarily to assure fairness to
defendants; they promote justice by
preventing surprises through revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber
until the evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared; in other words the defense
was designed to protect citizens from
stale and vexatious claims.
The merits of this defense in the instant
action are unimportant at this time;
however, the purpose and legislative
intent involved in the enactment of this
affirmative defense have a very worthy
objective and accordingly, depending on
the surrounding circumstances, such
purpose should not be treated with
indifference.
Where no prejudice results to the adverse
party, the Statute of Limitations can be
subsequently pleaded in an amended
answer, and there is no waiver of such
defense if the answer is properly amended
to include it.
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The

52 F.R.D., at 131.

See also Bireline v. Seagondollar', 567 F.

2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1977); American Air Filter Company,
Inc. v. Industrial Decking and Roofing Corp., 82 F.R.D. 681
(E-.D. Tenn. 1979).
The sound reasoning of the court in Eastridge is
directly applicable to this case.

Utah's interests in

protecting manufacturers against "stale and vexatious claims"
is given voice in Section 78-15-3 and should not have been
"treated with indifference" by the trial court.

Particularly

in light of the fact that the issue was properly before the
trial court in the Answer of American Motors Sales
Corporation, there was no justification for the trial court's
denial of Jeep Corporation's Rule 15(a) motion.

Such denial

was an abuse of discretion which deprived Jeep Corporation of
the possible protection of Section 78-15-3 and which requires
that the trial court's judgment be reversed.
B.

The Trial Court Should have Granted
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Directed Verdict
Based on the Statute of Limitations.

After the trial had been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved
for a directed verdict based on the limitations period contained in Section 78-15-3.

As has been noted above, this

issue was squarely presented in the Answer of American Motors
Sales Corporation.
the trial court.

The motion was denied without comment by
(T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775).
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The

trial court's action in this regard is in derogation of
Section 78-15-3.
As quoted above, the limitations period in the Utah
Product Liability Act bars actions brought "more than six
years after the date of initial purchase for use or
consumption...."

Plaintiffs' Commando was manufactured in

1971 for sale in the 1972 model year.
more than six years later, in 1979.

The accident occurred

Under the plain language

of Section 78-15-3, plaintiffs' action against AMC/Jeep was
time barred.

The trial court's failure to direct a verdict

on this ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment
should therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for six independently sufficient reasons:
First, a new trial is required because the trial
court erred in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant
and inflammatory evidence;
Second, a new trial is required because the trial
court compounded its first error by blocking AMC/Jeep's
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts;
Third, a new trial is required because the trial
court capped its evidentiary errors by excluding virtually
{

all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence;
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Fourthi a new trial is required because the trial
court erred in failing to grant AMC/Jeep's motion for a
mistrial based upon opposing counsels1 closing arguments
which stated that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to produce the very
demonstrative evidence that had been previously excluded by
the trial court;
Fifth, a new trial is required because the trial
court erroneously excluded all evidence relating to the
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seat belts;
and
Sixth, entry of judgment in favor of AMC/Jeep is
required because the trial court erred in failing to direct a
verdict based on AMC/Jeep's statute of limitations defense.
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